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The Burlington Races Revisited
A Revised Analysis of an 1813 Naval
Battle for Supremacy on Lake Ontario
Robert J. Williamson
'Q:om the safety of the Lake Ontario shore near
ll Burlington. military and civilian observers
witnessed the jockeying for position of many
sailing vessels during the afternoon of Tuesday.
September 28, 1813. They likened the event to a
yacht race. Thus, a pivotal naval engagement that
would determine the outcome of the War of 1812
was facetiously labelled, "The Burlington Races."
The facts of this important piece of Canadiana.
have, like so many significant historical events.
been cloaked by myth and misconception until
recently. The discovery in the US National
Archives of the log of the British flagship of the
Lake Ontario Squadron, HMS Wolfe, has made
it possible to interpret this episode in Canadian
history more accurately.
The Wolfe's log came to light by accident
during research for the Hamilton and Scourge
project in 19 71. How the log book of the Wolfe
found its way to Washington was, until recently,
a bit of a mystery. On 7 September 1999, the
National Archives in Washington verified that the
log was received in Washington on 2 December
1814 from Captain Tho. Macdonough of
Plattsburgh, New York. Therein lies the link with
Captain George Downie who, in June 1814, was
appointed to command HMS Wolfe or Montreal
as she had just recently been renamed. The name
change would have made the log of the Wolfe,
dated 8 June- 20 December 1813, redundant.
As an archival record, it would have been the
captain's responsibility to safeguard the log until
it could have been forwarded to the British
Admiralty. At the end of August, Downie was
hurriedly ordered to the Isle-aux-Noix shipyard
on Lake Champlain to command the newlylaunched frigate HMS Conjiance. On 11
September 1814. Downie was killed in action and
his squadron surrendered to Captain

Macdonough at the Battle of Plattsburgh. It is
almost certain that Macdonough found the log of
the Wolfe, awaiting delivery to the Admiralty, in
Downie's personal effects. Before being sent to
Washington, the log was viewed and signed by
Commodore Issac Chauncey, the senior officer
ofthe US Navy on the Great Lakes.
The Burlington Races occurred just 18 days
after Commodore Perry's stunning victory on
Lake Erie. Many historians, however, have failed
to realize that Perry's success was meaningless
without the necessary sequel on Lake Ontario,
the key to the Great Lakes. Commodore
Chauncey, having been overshadowed by his
subordinate's victory, was under pressure to
administer the "coup de grace." The British lion
on Lake Ontario had to be caged in order to bring
about an end to hostilities in Upper Canada, the
principal theatre of the war. This would allow
Major-General Wilkinson to safely tranship his
American army on the Niagara Peninsula to the
St. Lawrence River where, according to the United
States government's revised strategy for the war,
he would co-ordinate with Major-General
Hampton from Plattsburgh, New York, in a twopronged attack on Montreal. A stranglehold on
this choke point, the heart of the Canadian
colonies, would end the war. On the other hand,
an unchecked Royal Navy under the command
of the feted Commodore Sir James Yeo, roaming
freely on Lake Ontario, could spell disaster to
this new American offensive. Therefore, the event
that was to be called the Burlington Races would
prove to be a crucial naval engagement and
indeed, a turning point in the war.
On paper, the American squadron had the
advantage in numbers, ten vessels to six; and in
firepower, a broadside weight-of-metal ratio of
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Commodore Isaac Chauncey
NAC C 10926

three to two. They outgunned the British in long
range cannon by three to one. The only statistic
that favoured the Royal Navy was a 20 percent
surfeit in short range smashers or carronade.
These statistics are based on a report made by
Commodore Yeo to Admiral Warren on 29
September 1813. 1 In reality, the combatants were
more equal than the figures imply. Six ships of
the American squadron were converted merchant
schooners, not fighting ships. They were more
useful as gunboats for bombardment than naval
battles. Top heavy and unwieldy in bad weather,
their sailing characteristics were so divergent that
Chauncey had great difficulty in keeping his ships
in formation; so much so that in this action, three
of the schooners were tied to mother ships in a
towing formation. While these vessels added to
the weight of Chauncey's firepower, they seriously
hampered his speed and manoeuvrability. On the
other hand, the British ships were faster, held
their formation well and could better concentrate
their effort.
When the two squadrons met off the port of
York (Toronto) on this fateful day, the weather,
described in the log of the Wolfe, was "cloudy
with fresh breezes of E.N.E. wind." 2 According
to the navy's Beaufort Wind Scale which
measures wind force from 0-10, fresh breezes

Commodore Sir James Yeo
NACC22895

are force 5 with wind speed between 17 and 21
knots.:; The gale force winds of legend appear to
have been only in Chauncey's mind as he
searched for excuses to explain his later actions.
Yeo, havingjust arrived at York that morning, sent
a boat ashore with dispatches. At 10:00 am the
enemy squadron bore down on the anchorage.
By 10:30, Yeo had recovered his dispatch boat
and weighed anchor. He headed out into the lake
to gain "sea room" on a port tack. Since the wind
was from the ENE, this would have placed him
on a SSE course towards the Niagara River. At
12:30 pm, he manoeuvred to bring the American
squadron within range of his carronades while
at the same time causing the sluggish American
formation to become very extended.
Consequently, as the two squadrons engaged, it
was the two flagships, HMS Wolfe and USS Pike,
that took the brunt of the action. It should also
be noted that Yeo had manoeuvred the Americans
into a position where their gunnery solutions were
complicated. They had to engage the enemy with
their port side guns while heeled over to port on
a starboard tack. Nevertheless, by l :20 pm. the
Wolfe's main and mizzen topmasts were shot
away while the Pike had been dangerously holed
below the water line and had serious damage on
her forward gun deck when one of her own
cannons exploded, killing or wounding a large
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number of her crew. The damage to the Wo~fe's
sails meant a critical loss of manoeuvrability, but
the disciplined British formation, led by HMS
Royal George, intervened and helped extricate
their flagship from the close action. In Yeo's report
of the battle, he wrote, "[When] the main and
mizzen topmasts of this ship were shot away, by
which she became unmanageable on the wind, I
put the squadron before the wind for a small bay
at the head of the lake where he [Chauncey] would
have been under the necessity of engaging on
more equal terms. this however he declined ... and
on approaching the bay, he hauled off, leaving us
in this state perfectly unmolested to refit the
squadron." 4
Yeo's phrase, "engaging on more equal terms"
has never yet been satisfactorily explained by
historians. It certainly does not imply that he
intended to run away and hide behind a sandbar
at the head of the lake, an impression held by
many people until Robert Malcomson published

his recent book, Lords of the Lake. Military logic
dictates that because of battle damage to the
Wolfe's sails, Yeo could not engage in battle
manoeuvres and would have to attempt to make
a stand from an anchored position on a friendly
shore. An examination ofthe ship's log confirms
this. It states, "At 4.30 arrived with the squadron
and came to an anchor off Burlington Bay, close
in shore with springs on the cables." 5 By
anchoring his ships on their back springs (a
heavy hawser pulled the anchor to the ship's
stern) the ships could be swung in the wind by
releasing the spring hawser, thus presenting a
fresh bank of guns to the enemy when necessary.
Yeo would have doubled his firepower by this
procedure and negated his loss of
manoeuvrability by establishing a strong and
compact defensive unit at anchor. This was a
standard tactic of the period, used by the
American squadron successfully against the
British at Plattsburgh in 1814 on Lake
Champlain. Fifteen years earlier in 1798, the

Ninety minutes after tile engagement began tile British line, led by HMS Royal George. intervened to llelp
extricate their damaged .f1agsl1ip from tile close action witll USS Pike. This painting "Engagement in tile
Gale" is by Canadian marine artist Peter Rindlisbacller and tile original is lleld by tile Davies Charitable
Foundation.
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The Burlington
Races
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French fleet attempted this same strategy at
Aboukir Bay in Egypt against the formidable
Admiral Nelson. However, through daring and
superb seamanship, Nelson was able to envelop
the French line and destroy their immobile ships
one by one. But Commodore Chauncey was no
Nelson. Having put the British to flight, he was
satisfied to claim a partial victory. He declined
to take any further risk by being drawn into a
situation where he would have to engage the
enemy on more equal terms. It was a decision
that would haunt his reputation ever after.
By forming a battle line close into the shore
in a constricted area at the head of the lake, Yeo's
back was protected and the American ships, most
of them rather unwieldy, especially those towing
schooners, would have found manoeuvring in
such close environs very difficult and dangerous.
Chauncey made note of this in his report; "I
considered that if I chased the enemy to his
anchorage, we should [all] go on shore; he
amongst his friends, we amongst our enemies .. .!
[therefore] relinquished the opportunity of
acquiring individual reputation, at the expense
of my country." 6 In other words, he rightly
perceived the danger. Furthermore, in Chauncey's
Report to the Secretary of the Navy, he stated,
"At the time I gave up the chase, this ship was
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making so much water that it required all our
pumps to keep her free, owing to our receiving
several shots so far below the water's edge that
we could not plug the holes from the outside." 7
Many historians, having accepted the American
claim to victory, have conveniently overlooked the
fact that the Pike was perhaps more badly
damaged than the Wolfe, and probably in danger
of sinking. Furthermore, the weather was
deteriorating and it was not the American policy
to fight under such conditions which negated the
accuracy of their long range guns. Chauncey
turned away in order to get back to port in the
Niagara River as quickly as possible. From there
he was able to make repairs and keep the British,
who were anchored on the lake. under his
observation. If he was unable to defeat the British
squadron, then his primary objective was to keep
them away from the American convoys sailing
from Niagara carrying the American army to the
St. Lawrence River for the pending attack on
Montreal.~ No one, of course, had any inkling of
what misfortune lay ahead for the Americans at
Chrysler's farm and Chateauguay.
It is a Canadian myth that the British
squadron made a daring escape from Chauncey
by sailing through the four-foot shallows of the
Burlington Bay mouth sandbar at the head of
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This dramatic painting. e11tilled "Burlington Races" by Peter Rindlisbacller, portrays the damaged Wolfe
approaching the sandbar at the head of Lake Ontario, perpetuating the myth that the British squadron
crossed into Burlington Bay to escape their encounter with tile Americans. This painting was commissioned
by the Hamill.on - Scourge Foundation.

the lake. This embellished account, full of
swashbuckler "derring-do," first appeared in a
magazine serial for the Canadian Collier's
Weekly in 1913. It was to be part of the
celebrations for the centennial of the War of 1812.
Local historians in the Hamilton- Burlington area
embraced the exciting story with pride, even
though the author warned in his introduction,
that imagination had been used to "clothe the
dry bones of record with the flesh and blood of
fancy." 9 That fancy has become fact Many writers
since that time. including myself. have
perpetuated this account. A provincial historical
plaque on Burlington Heights now gives credence
to this myth. The Hamilton-Scourge Foundation
has further popularized the incident with their
beautiful prints of renowned Canadian artist
Peter Rindlisbacher's outstanding and dramatic

depiction of the Wolfe running close inshore at
Burlington Beach.
Yeo did not have to hide his squadron behind
the safety of a sandbar to escape an enemy who
had long since turned away, or to seek shelter
from a non-existent gale. Tucked into the
Burlington shore on Lake Ontario, he was
perfectly safe, for he knew the capabilities of his
enemy. Considering that Yeo arrived in Canada
after a court martial for grounding his last
command, it is highly unlikely that he would have
risked his entire squadron in the shallow channel
entrance to what is now Hamilton Harbour,
especially when it was unnecessary. But, legends
die hard. 10
The only way of setting the record straight is
to let the eye witnesses whose words were
11
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Although the log of HMS Wolfe does not record the speed or distance travelled, it does give time, direction
and juxtaposition of ships. Estimating an average speed of 10 mph, the above plan view presents a
reasonable depiction of what happened on 28 September 1913. Note that by anchoring at 4:30pm. the
British Squadron could not have reached, according to legend, the confines of what is now known as
Burlington Bay or Hamilton Harbour.

recorded, tell us what happened. They are the
watchkeeping officers of the Wolfe who made the
entries in the ship's Remarks Log. Although their
individual script, with unique characters and long
flourishing down or cross strokes, requires
careful study, their record is legible. The log does
not record speed or distance travelled, but it does
give date, time, weather, direction of movement
and position of ships. To depict the action of 28
September 1813 on a map to scale, an estimated
speed of the Wolfe is required. To establish this,
the writings of Patrick O'Brian, regarded by many
as the greatest navy historical authority of the
Napoleonic period, have been consulted. Eleven
knots or 12.7 mph appears to be the top speed
for a war ship under perfect conditions. 11
However, most marine engineers agree that 7
knots is a more reasonable speed, considering
the manoeuvering of the squadron and the Wolfe's
battle damage. The average speed of advance
would therefore have been about 8.05 mph or
13 kph. The distance from York to the head of
the lake, over water, is 50 kilometres. It would
have taken the Wolfe at least four hours to reach
the bay at the head of the lake. However, she

anchored at 4:30 pm, just three hours after
putting before the wind off York. The British
Admiralty charts of 1815 show an anchorage off
Bronte. Time and distance calculations indicate
that this anchorage is the logical position reached
by the British squadron. If these calculations are
correct, then the British could not have reached
the confines of Burlington Bay as the legend
states.
There is, however, even more compelling
evidence in the log. The squadron came to anchor
off Burlington Bay, not in it. Each day from
Tuesday, September 28 to Monday, October 4,
while at anchor, the log of the Wolfe records that
the enemy was in sight off Niagara. This
observation would only have been possible if the
British anchorage was in Lake Ontario off Bronte.
On 29 September, HMS Melville and HMS
Beresford weighed anchor and were sent to scout
out the enemy. On 2 October, at 6:00am the sick
and wounded were sent to hospital in York on
board the sloop Mary Ann. At 8:00am the entire
squadron weighed anchor and made sail towards
4 Mile Creek Uust east of the Niagara River). Late
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that afternoon near 12 Mile
Creek (St. Catharines), a
boat came off shore with
Colonel
Harvey
to
communicate with the
Commodore. The next
morning, Sunday, October 3,
the squadron returned to
their anchorage at the head
of the lake. 12 During all these
activities the log does not
make any reference to
crossing or re-crossing the
sand bar into Burlington Bay.
Such freedom of movement
could only have been
possible if the squadron was
anchored on the lake.
A provincial plaque on Burlington Heights erroneously gives credence

The legend also claims
to the myth that during the battle, the British squadron ran away
that the Canadian pilot of the
and hid in Burlington Bay.
Wolfe, James Richardson Jr., was awarded a
greatest damage was done to his reputation.
pension for his part in guiding the ship over the
During this engagement when he appeared to
sandbar. Richardson wrote his memoirs after the
have attained the upper hand, he proved wary
war. While there is extensive coverage of his life
and excessively cautious, not making the best use
on Lake Ontario, and in particular, the Battle of
of his force. In 1814 he became even less effective.
Oswego where he lost his arm, there is no
Throughout the war, he failed, except for brief
mention of any heroic passage over the sandbar
periods, to establish a naval superiority on Lake
into Burlington Bay. His pension was most likely
Ontario. At last, the confidence of President
awarded for the loss of his arm at Oswego, not
Madison was shaken, and he ordered
his supposed navigational expertise.I3
Commodore Decatur to relieve him. 15 But the
damage was done. Without naval superiority on
Lake Ontario, the Americans had no chance of
The Wolfe's Remarks Log and Richardson's
winning the War of 1812.
memoirs are the only contemporary records of
what happened that day. If the squadron had
In the aftermath of this event, both sides
crossed the sandbar and entered Burlington Bay,
attempted
to preserve a measure of pride
these most relevant sources would have recorded
commensurate
with the battle's historic
the fact. They do not. Therefore, the story is a
importance.
Incredibly,
both American and
myth, a tale dressed up to make an interesting
Canadian
historians
have
generally
accepted that
magazine series, almost one hundred years ago.
it was an American victory because the British
"ran away." However, on closer examination, we
In reality, the British and Americans eyed
can interpret that the British squadron only
each other suspiciously from their respective
retreated to where it could assume a strong
anchorages across the lake and licked their
defensive
position by anchoring with springs on
wounds. Their commanders evaluated their
their
cables,
close inshore at the head of the lake.
situation and made out their reports. Chauncey
This
was
a
standard
practice employed by all
stated that he had 27 men killed and wounded
14
navies
of
that
period.
With the American
including 22 by the bursting of a gun. The log
squadron
heading
for
home,
it was unnecessary
of the Wo{fe reports, "two men viz. John
for the British to salvage victory from defeat by
Edwards, seaman and Charles Kinslea M. Arms,
brazenly crossing the sandbar and hiding in
killed and two seamen, Robert Archibald and
Burlington Bay (Hamilton Harbour). That is pure
John Baker wounded." If casualty reports mean
myth. It was, in fact, the Americans who turned
anything to the outcome of a battle, then
away, their flagship in jeopardy of sinking, their
Chauncey clearly had suffered the most. But the
13
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HMS

Wolfe leads the British Squadron out

Q[ Toronto Harbour; September 28, 1813 by Peter Rindlisbacher.

ungainly mixture of ships wary of manoeuvring
on a lee shore in deteriorating weather conditions
and their commander unwilling to face the British
on "more equal terms." Under these
circumstances, one can hardly describe this event
as a British defeat.
However, strategically, the Americans
accomplished their goaL While the refitting
squadrons surveyed each other from across the
lake, General Wilkinson moved his army from
the Niagara Peninsula to the St. Lawrence River,
unmolested. In the end, however, this strategy
accomplished nothing. It was, in fact, a disaster
for the Americans. Both armies came to ruin in
the St. Lawrence Valley: General Wilkinson's
army at Chrysler's farm and General Hampton,
at Chateauguay. The assault on Montreal fizzled
out. The British army, meanwhile, occupied the
weakened Niagara frontier and captured Fort
Niagara, thereby making the Niagara River a
British supply port for their troops on the Niagara
Peninsula. Yeo's Lake Ontario naval squadron
survived the scrape of 28 September as strong
as ever. In fact, it went on the offensive in the
following Spring and helped to capture Fort
Oswego along with enough naval stores to
significantly delay Chauncey's ship building
program at Sackets Harbour. This had serious
consequences for the American offensive in the
summer of 1814.

With the aid of information provided by the
log of HMS Wolfe it is now clear that the naval
engagement known as the Burlington Races, was
conducted by the British with characteristic
professionalism, in keeping with the high
standards of the Royal Navy during the Nelson
period. By maintaining the integrity of his
squadron, Yeo played a far more important role
in the events of the War of 1812 that shaped our
future, than generations of historians have been
prepared to grant him. If the British naval
squadron on Lake Ontario had not thwarted
Chauncey's attempt to attain complete control
of the Great Lakes on 28 September 1813, it is
safe to say that Sou them Ontario would probably
be a state of the American Union today. If in doubt
about Yeo's accomplishment, then refer to the
words of the greatest military authority of that
period, the Duke of Wellington, who is reported
to have said, "Any offensive operation founded
upon Canada must be preceded by naval
superiority on the Lakes."

Postscript

I\ 11 too many historians of the War of 1812 have
r-lfailed to show the relationship between land
battles and the less glamorous but vital, naval
control of supply routes. Consequently, events
such as the "Burlington Races" are dismissed as
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insignificant engagements in comparison to the
Battle of Lake Erie, which has for almost two
centuries, overshadowed it. However, on further
analysis, the fallout of the "Burlington Races" had
a far greater impact on the outcome of the war
than Perry's victory on Lake Erie.
For example, after 10 September 1813, with
Lake Erie under American control, the British
on the Detroit frontier were completely exposed
on their southern flank and withdrew up the
Thames Valley towards Burlington Heights. The
American army under General Harrison followed.
On 3 October 1813, the British were defeated at
the Battle of the Thames and nothing stood
between Harrison and Lake Ontario. It was one
of the darkest days in the War of 1812 for the
British. Things were so bad that Governor
General Prevost ordered General Vincent at
Burlington Heights to abandon Upper Canada
and retreat to Montreal. Fortunately, General
Vincent was made of sterner stuff, and like Nelson
with his blind eye at the Battle of Copenhagen.
chose to ignored his superior. After all, the British
Lake Ontario Squadron had not been defeated
on 28 September and was presently anchored
on his doorstep at the head of the lake. He
correctly assessed that Harrison was not a threat
as long as the Americans had not achieved naval
control of Lake Ontario. With Wilkinson's army
heading eastward down the St. Lawrence River,
Harrison was quite isolated and had no choice
but to return to his supply base at Detroit. Thus
ended the invasion of Upper Canada from the
west.
The invasion of Upper Canada from Buffalo
in 1814 also failed because Yeo had been able to
fend off the American attempt to take naval
control of Lake Ontario. By maintaining the
integrity of his squadron, Yeo was eventually able
to go on the offensive and in the spring and
summer of 1814 attained naval control of Lake
Ontario by default. Thus the British were at
liberty to resupply and re-enforce their army on
the Niagara Peninsula and thereby played an
important but unsung part in the defeat of the
American invasion of Canada at the Battle of
Lundy's Lane. From the port of York on the
evening of 24 July 1814, HMS Star and HMS
Charwell embarked General Drummond,
Lieutenant-Colonel Morrison, the hero of
Chrysler's Farm, and 400 men of the tough 89th
Regiment. With a fair breeze, the ships arrived

in the mouth of the Niagara River at daybreak.
Augmented by the troops from the local garrison
at Fort George, the 89th Regiment, under the
command of General Drummond, marched up
the river road to play their part in Canada's
destiny along an insignificant farmer's lane within
earshot of Niagara Falls. Once again it can be
seen how the outcome of the War of 1812 can be
traced to that pivotal naval engagement known
as the Burlington Races.
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